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HAWALA’S CHARM: WHAT BANKS CAN LEARN FROM
INFORMAL FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS
ABSTRACT
Hawala networks, or Informal Funds Transfer Systems (IFTS), are
age-old means of conducting cross-border financial transactions. They
thrive in regions where there is inadequate or nonexistent financial infrastructure due to poverty, daunting geography, or endemic conflict. Such
regions are home to poor and underserved communities hungry for and in
desperate need of financial services. IFTS provide access to these relatively ignored markets through the use of specific transactional mechanisms,
payment modalities, and clearing and settlement options. With these innovative and flexible techniques, IFTS have successfully tapped into the
exponentially growing global remittance market. Hawala networks are
also used by NGOs and humanitarian aid organizations operating in postconflict regions, and by diaspora communities looking to provide vital
services for family members in their country of origin. IFTS, however, can
also be illegitimately used for smuggling, capital flight, or terrorist activities. Formal financial institutions can learn how to better access the remittance market and serve remote or poor communities by learning from the
key operational characteristics that make IFTS so successful: speed and
efficiency, accessibility and adaptability, affordability, anonymity, cultural
sensitivity, and relational contracts. Understanding these operational
characteristics can allow for innovative, Hawala-inspired inclusion techniques to be incorporated into the formal infrastructure. Mobile banking,
adaptive financial procedures and services, broad integration, and a shift
in the banking culture would not only allow for formal financial institutions to gain access to the lucrative remittance market, but would also
improve access to financial services for the poor and underserved.
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INTRODUCTION
Informal Funds Transfer Systems (IFTS), commonly called Hawala
networks, are age-old methods of conducting financial transactions across
various borders and cultures using a system of trust and social investment.
IFTS thrive in regions where formal financial institutions dare not or cannot succeed.1 IFTS do not operate in the shadowy leftovers of the formal
regime,2 but rather enjoy prime access to the growing multi-billion dollar
domestic and international remittance market.3 By understanding the operational characteristics that make IFTS so successful, formal banking institutions can learn how to successfully operate in warring, post-conflict, and
developing regions, thus gaining access to a wider market of individuals.4
Through the use of innovative financial inclusion techniques inspired by
Hawala networks, formal institutions can become more competitive in the
remittance market, and can help provide access to financial services in the
poor and underserved regions of the world.5
This Note will not attempt to criticize the various regulation mechanisms put in place to shut down, outwit, or destabilize the many existing
IFTS, specifically Hawala as operated in the Middle East. Nor will this
Note discuss in great detail the connection such informal systems have to
black market or terrorist activities. There is a plethora of well-written and
well-researched literature that covers both topics substantially.6 Rather,
this Note will attempt to: (1) explain the characteristics that make IFTS so
successful, and (2) identify lessons that formal banking institutions can
learn from such systems in order to be more competitive in the lucrative
remittance market. In turn, this analysis can give formal institutions the
tools needed to provide increased access to financial services for poor and
underserved communities in regions previously deemed uneconomical or
inaccessible.
Part I of this Note will provide background information on the various
Informal Funds Transfer Systems, or Hawala networks, that cross ethnic
and state boundaries.7 Part II will describe the basic transaction mechanisms and payment modalities that are used by IFTS.8 Part III will discuss
1

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part II.B.
3
See infra Parts IV.A, V.
4
See infra Part V.
5
See infra Part VI.
6
See infra note 136.
7
See infra Part I.
8
See infra Part II.
2
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the various clearing and settlement options, both complex and simple, that
IFTS use to settle debts and balance payments.9 Part IV will briefly describe the four most common uses for IFTS: remittances; NGOs and humanitarian aid assistance in conflict regions; international services for
diaspora communities; and illegitimate uses, such as smuggling and capital flight.10 Part V will analyze the operational characteristics that make
IFTS so successful in the remittance market.11 Part VI will propose programs, inspired by the key characteristics of IFTS, that formal financial
institutions can implement as a means of competing for the remittance
market and improving financial access to the poor in post-conflict and
remote regions.12
I. INFORMAL FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS BACKGROUND
A. Definition
Hawala-type networks, or Informal Funds Transfer Systems, have
been known across time and cultures by many different names, and they
continue to successfully operate in all parts of the world.13 The World
Bank and IMF have been explicit in using the term “Informal Funds
Transfer Systems” for very specific reasons.14 The first reason is that such
systems often function as the primary means of conducting financial transactions in many areas of the world; therefore, referring to IFTS as “alternative remittance systems” would be inaccurate.15 Second, the term “underground banking” is misleading because in communities where IFTS
prosper, the systems frequently function openly, though not necessarily
with formal or political acknowledgment.16 Third, as this Note will discuss
in Part I.B infra, Hawala systems cross many borders, cultures, and religions, so referring to them as “ethnic banking” is unnecessarily restric-

9

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
11
See infra Part V.
12
See infra Part VI.
13
PATRICK M. JOST & HARJIT S. SANDHU, INTERPOL GEN. SECRETARIAT, THE
HAWALA ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEM AND ITS ROLE IN MONEY LAUNDERING 4
(2000).
14
MOHAMMED EL QORCHI, SAMUEL M. MAIMBO & JOHN F. WILSON, INFORMAL
FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMAL HAWALA SYSTEM 6 (Int’l
Monetary Fund 2003) [hereinafter JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER].
15
Id.
16
Id.
10
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tive.17 Fourth, the term IFTS more accurately reflects the fact that these
systems operate using modalities very similar to those used in “conventional” or “formal” banking systems.18 Finally, though only inferred by the
World Bank and IMF, terms like “underground banking” merely enforce
the negative stereotypes and connotations that have been associated with
Hawala-type networks since September 11, 2001.19 It is for these reasons
that this Note will only refer to such systems as Hawala, or IFTS, in order
to avoid the negative connotations and confusing images created by other
illegal transactions that often receive the same label.20
Hawala in Arabic translates to “transfer,”21 and in Hindi it means
“trust,” or a valuable item that is passed on to a trusted party for delivery.22 It is important to keep in mind that though this Note will use the
term “Hawala” to represent IFTS, the term is used in some countries to
refer to formal money transfers in commercial banking.23 The most common reference to Hawala, however, is in reference to informal financial
systems.
B. Historical Context
IFTS existed long before formal banking, and they will continue to exist as banks rise and fall in various nations. Across the board, the primary
purpose of Hawala-type transfer systems has been to facilitate trade between distant regions.24 The origins of these systems can be murky at
times, but regardless of where the systems are centrally located, they tend
to share a few common characteristics.
1. Institutional Basis
Before discussing the specific informal financial systems of ancient
and medieval commerce, it is important to understand the institutional
17

Id.
Id.
19
John F. Wilson, Senior Economist, Middle E. Dep’t, Int’l Monetary Fund, Hawala
and Other Informal Payment Systems: An Economic Perspective at the Seminar on Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law 1 (May 6, 2002), http://www.imf
.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/wilson.pdf.
20
Id. at 2.
21
JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 6.
22
Matthew Schramm & Markus Taube, Evolution and Institutional Foundation of the
Hawala Financial System, 12 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 405, 407 (2003).
23
JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 6.
24
Id. at 10.
18
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developments that allowed for such systems to exist successfully. The
majority of pre-modern merchants found themselves traveling through and
operating in environments that lacked the formal mechanisms needed to
conduct complex long-distance business transactions.25 Alternatively,
where such formal systems did exist, “the state as an institution that enforce[d] contracts and property rights and provide[d] public goods pose[d]
a dilemma: [for a] state with sufficient coercive power to do these things
also had the power to withhold protection or confiscate private wealth.”26
Essentially, businessmen of the pre-modern world were left struggling
with commercial systems that were incomplete, incapable of providing a
working formal system, or subject to a political regime of the strength or
corruptibility that would significantly decrease the merchants’ profit margin—a high price considering the means of travel at the time.27 Furthermore, if there was a formal system in place, it was often restricted to a
particular tribal region, and the resulting “transaction radius within which
business could be conducted under [a] protective wing ... was ... narrow.”28 When a merchant stepped outside this protective sphere, he was
once again subject to the dangers mentioned above.
Another impediment to the pre-modern transaction was the limited
means of payment available across communities. Because hard currency,
such as silver or gold bullion, was not readily available to everyone, and
because reliance on a barter system subjected merchants to additional
risks, a new means of transactional arrangement needed to be developed.29
2. China
The Tang Dynasty of 618–907 created an informal financial transfer
system known as the Fei-ch’ien, or the Flying Money System.30 The Tang
developed it as a means to cope with its robust economy, specifically the
transference of tax revenues.31 The use of the Fei-ch’ien did not end with
the fall of the Tang Dynasty. Between 1368 and 1644, the Ming Dynasty
began to decrease its use of paper money, and instead used the now-classic
informal remittance system for the majority of its financial transfers.32 The
25

Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 406.
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 406–07.
30
JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 10.
31
Id.
32
Id.
26
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Ch’ing Dynasty continued to develop the system from 1644 to 1911.33 Feich’ien played a crucial role in the cotton trade when a cotton dyestuff
network began to include money transfers in its services repertoire; as
more dyestuff stores began to do the same, a “China-wide network”
formed.34
The Fei-ch’ien was especially useful in both the tea trade35 and as foreign actors expanded into China.36 As a means of avoiding foreigncontrolled financial intermediaries and colonial powers, “money changers,
gold dealers, and trading companies” used the informal system to prosper
under colonial repression.37
3. India
India’s ancient informal financial system, now illegal but still in use, is
known as Hundi.38 Early forms of bills of exchange and other promissory
notes appear to have been the primary means of conducting pre-modern
Hundi transactions, because there has been no evidence found of paper
money or negotiable instruments in ancient India.39
Hundi was developed under a “strong body of rules, usage, and customs” that received government recognition, so much so that these bills of
exchange were circulated amongst Indian bankers for intrastate trade,
integrated into the modern banking system, and defended on occasion by
the courts on behalf of the business community.40 It was only after the
infamous Jain Hawala scandal, in which bribes and political corruption
dominated the headlines in the 1990s, that Hundi became completely illegal.41 Prior to the scandal, the local Hundi customs and usages were still
permitted by the legislature.42
Hundi spread north from the subcontinent as traders conducted business with India’s neighbors, specifically Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.43
It is possible that Hundi’s use began to spread north during the time of the
33

Id.
Id.
35
Rachana Pathak, Note, The Obstacles to Regulating the Hawala: A Cultural Norm
or a Terrorist Hotbed?, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2007, 2010–11 (2004).
36
JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 10.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 11 box 4.1.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 10 n.12, 11 box 4.1.
42
JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 11 box 4.1.
43
Id. at 10.
34
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Mughal Empire.44 Informal transfers became particularly important when
currency export between India and Pakistan was made illegal around the
time of the 1947 partition.45
4. Europe
In Europe, the development of banking activity can be credited in part
to the prevalent use of bills of exchange, which are “an obligation in the
form of a payment order addressed to the [payee].”46 Bills of exchange
were first widely used in Italy during the fourteenth century by money
exchangers conducting remittance transactions.47 Towards the end of the
sixteenth century, bills of exchange spread through France and England as
a means of facilitating domestic trade and personal transactions.48
5. Middle East
The Muslim-majority world is most commonly associated with Hawala, especially after Americans became aware of the word following 9/11.49
Perhaps contrary to popular belief, the history of Hawala in the Middle
East and Arabic world has not been well documented.50 The primary purpose of Hawala was to assist in trading with multiple regions, within fiefdoms of varying distances, and between areas of varying terrain.51 Scholars suggest it evolved specifically to avoid robbery along the silk trading
route.52 Another theory is that it developed when the South Asian diaspora
communities in pre-modern East Africa needed a means to settle accounts.53
The term Hawala, as a legal concept, can be found in Arabic texts dating back to 1327.54 While it began as a classic delegation of payment or
transfer, various contractual obligations and parameters began to take
44

Pathak, supra note 35, at 2011.
JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 10 (“[A]fter ... 1947, virtually
no payment connected with trade with India and Pakistan was transacted through
banks.”).
46
Id. at 11.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 19, at 1–2.
50
JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 11.
51
Id.
52
See Pathak, supra note 35, at 2011 & n.17.
53
JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 11.
54
Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 407.
45
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shape in accordance with developing Islamic legal traditions.55 This allowed Hawala to expand its scope beyond the relatively common hard
currency issues of the pre-modern Middle East, and into an institution
built to decrease the uncertainties and risks involved in cross-border dealings.56
C. Common Aspects
As mentioned, although the word Hawala is most often associated with
the Middle East and Muslim communities, the various informal funds
transfer systems all share similar key traits. The first is that such informal
transactions almost inevitably cross international lines.57 The second characteristic, a logical conclusion of the first, is that such transactions will
involve more than one currency.58 Third, the transactions involve principal
and intermediary parties59 who have a financial position in core and peripheral transactions.60
II. TRANSACTION MECHANISMS
A. Basics
From simple to complex, an informal funds transfer involves a specific
set of parties who vary in number based on the complexity and sophistication of the transaction. The “hawaladar”61 is the broker, money remitter, or
money exchange dealer whom the client contacts in order to initiate a
transfer.62 Clients range from businesses to individuals. The classic example involves an immigrant in Country A seeking to send money back to his
family overseas in Country B. The hawaladar in Country A receives the
money from the client, in addition to a small fee for his services.63 For the
street exchange value of the amount given,64 Hawaladar A contacts his
55

Id.
Id.
57
Wilson, supra note 19, at 2.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 410.
61
Used interchangeably with the term broker throughout this Note.
62
See Smriti S. Nakhasi, Comment, Western Unionizing the Hawala?: The Privatization of Hawalas and Lender Liability, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 475, 477 (2007); Samuel
M. Maimbo, The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala System in
Afghanistan 3 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 13, 2003).
63
Pathak, supra note 35, at 2013–14.
64
Wilson, supra note 19, at 8.
56
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associate in Country B, generally via phone or email, to communicate the
password, amount, and even payment location.65 A then provides his client
with a code or password, which the client then passes along to the receiving party.66 Hawaladar B will then release the funds to the party providing
the code or password.67 Once A has passed along the information to his
counterpart, A’s part in the transaction is complete, and usually any written records are eliminated to preserve the privacy of the parties.68 B will
do the same once payment has been issued.69 On average, a Hawala transaction will take less than twenty-four hours to complete.70
Even though no hard currency has been transferred across state lines,
the transaction still does not result in a mysterious movement of money as
the headlines like to depict.71 Informal transfers have similar accounting
details to international transactions occurring through formal banking
channels; the only difference is that one transaction is regulated and the
other is not.72 In fact, many informal funds transfers indirectly involve the
formal system. Although the hawaladar “does not depend on a complicated infrastructure” in order to conduct his business, he often uses an
“officially established checking account” associated to his name or small
business.73 A majority of international hawaladars hold at least one or two
accounts with formal financial institutions.74 This account is where the
hawaladar deposits the client’s funds or withdraws funds for the beneficiary.75 For all intents and purposes, the hawaladar’s designated bank
account functions and acts as a bank financing the informal transactions.76
B. Payment Modalities
The payment modalities involved with informal transactions are also
very similar to formal international transactions. It is rare for physical cash
65

Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 408.
Nakhasi, supra note 62, at 477.
67
Id.
68
Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 408.
69
See id.
70
Id.
71
See JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 14 (discussing the misleading assertion that informal transactions result in money submerging on one side and
popping out in a village across the world).
72
Id.
73
Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 408–09.
74
Maimbo, supra note 62, at 7.
75
Id.
76
See Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 409 (discussing “bank within a bank” assertions).
66
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to move across borders in either formal or informal transfers. For example,
when conducting a remittance payment or international transfer, be it
through one’s bank or Western Union, no physical funds are moved. Instead, the transaction can be described as follows:
[T]ransmission of a payment order is ... based on a receipt of some
funds at the remitting end of the transaction. Actual payment is made to
the beneficiary out of balances at the receiving end; settlement follows
or, in cases where there are no exchange control issues, institutional accounts can be debited/credited ....77

Again, no physical money is being moved, yet the public does not
deem such transactions as mysterious or underground, even though “neither formal nor informal financial systems necessarily transfer funds from
one jurisdiction to another. Instead they depend on a sequence of accounting debits and credits among accounts kept by a network of individuals,
companies, accountants, [and other relevant parties].”78 In the formal system, these types of exchanges are known as Balance of Payment Accounts, because the transaction is “intrinsically paired with an international capital flow.”79 The ability for a client to send funds internationally is
enabled by the fact that there are two parties willing to finance the remittance transaction through cross-border asset and liability exchanges.80 The
same willingness must exist in the informal systems, except that the willing parties are individuals rather than formal institutions or banks.
III. CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT OPTIONS
A. Consolidation: Retail versus Wholesale Brokers
Because most informal funds transactions are rather complicated, and
because of the imbalances that result on the hawaladars’ accounts—
especially when handling remittances—a multi-tiered system has evolved
within the various IFTS.81 Frequently, “[i]ndividual ‘retail’ hawaladars
settle their balances with a local ‘wholesale’ hawaladar who eventually
balances the consolidated local transfer balance with his counterparts in
other localities.”82 This allows for the balance of sums on the account to
77

JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 14.
Maimbo, supra note 62, at 8.
79
JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 17.
80
Id.
81
Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 408 n.1.
82
Id.
78
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be cleared.83 Wholesale broker (hawaladar) set-ups are especially useful in
cases where the incoming and outgoing payments between brokers are
from numerous remittance transactions.84 For example, during the 1990s,
the Xawilaad85 of Somalia were incorporated as franchises into the agent
networks of larger enterprises that specialized in money transfers.86 This
created a centralized hub in which to consolidate and settle debts.87
The development of wholesale brokers indicates a vast network that
has found a means of consolidating accounts in order to streamline the
cost of settlement. In fact, where “regulatory environments and market
size permit, there has been a growing ‘professionalization’ and development of the larger [wholesale] enterprises.”88 It would be rather costly for
small-scale operators, functioning in multiple continents, to deal with
countless small positions, both incoming and outgoing.89 The wholesale
hawaladars consolidate the small positions into larger subtotals, and then
conduct business with other large-scale hawaladar operations.90 The IFTS
have developed various settlement procedures to further handle the account balances described above.
B. Simple Reverse Transaction
A simple reverse transaction is a basic tit-for-tat transaction in which
incoming equals outgoing, but such easy balancing rarely occurs for two
reasons. First, as mentioned previously, there is a “low probability that
Hawala remittances from Country B to Country A would pass through the
same hawaladars” as another remittance traveling from Country A to
Country B.91 The second, more relevant reason, is that aggregate remittance flows are largely asymmetrical between countries.92 Countries with
83

Id. at 408.
Id. at 408 & n.1. For example, a U.S.-based hawaladar is unlikely to be able to balance his account from income transfers with his hawaladar counterpart in Somalia, because the influx of funds from Somalia to the U.S. would not be at an equivalent rate.
85
Xawilaad is the Somali rendering of Hawala and means “transfer of debt.” Anna
Lindley, Between “Dirty Money” and “Development Capital”: Somali Money Transfer
Infrastructure Under Global Scrutiny, 108 AFR. AFF. 519, 522 (2009).
86
Id. at 523.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 533.
89
Wilson, supra note 19, at 6.
90
Id. The IMF and World Bank are unclear on how to classify these larger operations;
in fact, some experts believe they should not be classified as hawaladars. Id. (discussing
how in Dubai these wholesale hawaladars are referred to as “exchange houses”).
91
JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 14.
92
Wilson, supra note 19, at 7.
84
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large immigrant populations or migrant workers are the logical sources of
net remittances, and countries with large emigrant populations are the
natural recipients of net remittances. For example, the United States will
have large outflows, and Latin American countries will have large inflows,
but aggregately, it is unlikely that Latin American countries will experience large outflows and the United States will experience large inflows.93
C. Complex Reverse Transaction
Complex reverse transactions are an option commonly used when
transactions involve a country that is subject to costly exchange controls
or currency restrictions.94 These transactions incorporate the idea of a
multi-tiered system.95 An illustration of this system is as follows: Broker A
has an unsettled position with Broker B. B receives local currency from his
client, who wants to send it to Country C. However, B is unable to complete this transaction for a variety of reasons, the most common of which
is an unfavorable exchange rate.96 To solve this problem, B would need
the assistance of an outside party. B could, for example, seek help from A,
if A is able to recommend a broker in Country C. In such a case, A is
usually an associate of the broker in Country C, or knows Broker C due to
an unsettled position between the two from a previous transaction.97 A can
instruct C to have the funds available for B, or B can deal directly with C,
and can instruct A to settle the transaction. This would avoid the currency
control issue and would clear the initial position between A and B.98
D. Bilateral Settlement
1. Financial Settlement through Banks
A bilateral financial settlement through a bank rarely happens, but if
one were to occur, Hawaladar A would deposit money directly into Hawaladar B’s account in order to clear an earlier position or debt.99 The bank’s
foreign exchange rate, however, would be triggered by this action, because
93

JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 14.
Wilson, supra note 19, at 7.
95
Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 408 n.1.
96
Wilson, supra note 19, at 8.
97
JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 15.
98
Id.
99
Id.
94
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the banks are in different countries.100 The more common method of conducting a bilateral settlement would be for A to simply deposit the initial
client’s money into B’s foreign account.101
2. Settlement through Import/Export Clearing
Settling through import/export clearing is similar to bilateral settlement through a bank, but it involves the import/export of goods. Such
bilateral trade can manifest in a few ways. During the initial transaction,
after receiving the client’s funds, Hawaladar A could simply send goods to
Hawaladar B. These goods, such as jewels, gold, or electronics, would
amount to the payment B makes available to the beneficiary.102 A could
also, in a later transaction, finance imports to Country B or pay for the
imported goods.103 As a result, exports from Country A to Country B are
paid for by the balances due between Hawaladars A and B.104 For example,
at the end of the month, if an outstanding balance exists between A in
Afghanistan and B in Australia, B can use a Japanese bank account to
purchase cars for export to Afghanistan. Once the cars arrive, they would
be transferred to A’s care, and A can sell them for profit.105 This transaction would thus clear the outstanding balance between the two parties.
E. Multilateral Trade
Similar to the bilateral importing or exporting of goods to balance accounts, multilateral trading of goods incorporates the wholesale, largescale operators mentioned above. Multilateral trade can manifest itself in
countless scenarios. An example would be when Broker A pays, on behalf
of Broker C, for a series of wholesale exports sent from Country C to
Country B.106 Another such scenario could involve Broker B transferring
his claim with A to an associate in Country D. Because B has an open
position with D, A will send the exports to D, thus clearing both balances.
Such transactions can become increasingly complicated and create a robust influx of goods into a market, but each time they result in a chain of
transactions that are entirely invisible to financial regulations.107
100

Id. app. 1 at 30 tbl.A1.2.
Id. at 15.
102
Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 408.
103
JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 15–16.
104
Wilson, supra note 19, at 8.
105
Maimbo, supra note 62, at 6 box 1.
106
JOINT IMF-WORLD BANK PAPER, supra note 14, at 16.
107
Id.
101
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F. Misstatement and Over/Under Invoicing
The misstatement of trade values on invoices is a means of settlement
that involves over- and under-invoicing import/export transactions. Rather
than concealing an import, as occurs in smuggling, the imports are recorded under value, thus reimbursing a hawaladar with an open position.108 In
addition, “the importer [or hawaladar] in Country B may also benefit from
reduced tariff payments,” which can help slowly clear the accounts between Hawaladar B and Hawaladar A.109 Over numerous transactions, the
positions will eventually balance out as the over- and under-invoicing of
goods slowly benefits one or both hawaladars.
G. Smuggling
The next logical means of settlement by trade is smuggling. This Note
will go into more detail about the smuggling opportunities some IFTS
offer,110 but the simplicity of smuggling mechanisms warrants brief mention. For example, should Hawaladar B be entitled to a specific quantity of
goods after a transaction with Hawaladar A,111 A can settle the balance by
accepting the risk and smuggling the goods into Country B on behalf of
Hawaladar B.
H. International Services
One of the most common settlement options is the provision of international services, such as travel, medical treatment, or educational
funds.112 Hawaladar B provides these services to the beneficiaries in
Country B, or to himself, but the services are financed by Hawaladar A, a
client, or one of the consolidated wholesalers mentioned above.113 The
purchasing of services provides another means to avoid currency controls,
because a client or hawaladar can opt to purchase the services with local
currency rather than dealing with the hassles of currency controls.114
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I. International Investment and Capital Flight
The final method of settlement that brokers can use to clear balances is
through international investment. For example, rather than Hawaladar B
having a foreign bank account, B and his partners can purchase various
assets, such as bonds, stocks, or real estate.115 The purchases are made in
exchange for the balance owed by Hawaladar A, and A pays for the assets
in the name of B or B’s partners.116 Such transactions represent yet another
intersection between formal and informal transfer systems. Furthermore,
they illustrate the most common method used to engage in capital flight,
because “the [final holder] of services or assets never actually purchases
foreign exchange.”117 This settlement method is commonly used in countries where citizens are restricted or prohibited from owning foreign assets.118
IV. USES
IFTS provide a variety of uses, and offer a diverse set of both legitimate and illegitimate services, depending on the region and value being
transferred. The most common legitimate uses for IFTS are remittances,
NGO or humanitarian aid, and services. Illegitimate uses encompass capital flight, black market dealings, evasion, and terrorist activities.
A. Remittances
Remittance transactions occur primarily in countries with large immigrant or migrant worker populations.119 IFTS serve as a cheap and convenient means for immigrant families to send money to relatives in their
country of origin, or for migrant workers to send money to family in more
remote parts of the state.120 Afghanistan alone has nearly 30% of its population externally and internally displaced, and remittances from outside of
Afghanistan are received by about 15% of the rural population, which is
20% of their average expenditure.121 These transactions are often small
115
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enough that banks would not generally view them as profitable endeavors.122 Companies like Western Union are the formal options for transmitting remittances, but unlike IFTS, Western Union has limited access to
remote and war-torn areas.123
B. NGOs and Humanitarian Aid
Organizations that operate in emerging conflict, warring, or postconflict regions must make use of the local IFTS in order to fund and
conduct relief operations.124 Essentially, these transactions act like largescale remittances.125 Transporting large amounts of physical cash is often
expensive, dangerous, and logistically impossible.126 In countries where
humanitarian relief and post-conflict reconstruction operations are occurring, the formal banking systems are non-existent, destroyed, corrupt, or
non-operational.127
For example, in Kabul during and after the Taliban’s regime, the hawaladars were the only active and reliable financial actors, offering financial and non-financial services to local, regional, and international
clients.128 As a result, foreign and local aid agencies found themselves
using the Hawala system in order to transfer sums ranging from USD
$100,000 to $1,000,000.129 In fact, “[n]early all nongovernmental organizations, aid donors, and development agencies used the Hawala system to
deliver humanitarian relief and developmental aid to Afghanistan and to
move funds around the country.”130 The organizations found there was no
limit to how much the hawaladars of Kabul were capable of transferring.131 Furthermore, transfer fees averaged from 1–2%, and most transfers
were completed in twenty-four hours.132
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C. Services
Another very important use that IFTS provide is the ability for individuals or families to pay for services overseas. This can range from
something as trivial as travel expenses to something as important as college tuition or medical bills.133 Especially in emergency medical situations, immigrant populations find IFTS extremely helpful in quickly sending money back to relatives or elderly parents.
D. Illegitimate Uses
The use of IFTS among smugglers, terrorists, and other black market
operations has been widely covered.134 As discussed previously, the informal systems can easily be used for capital flight and customs evasions.135 More pertinent to current events is that IFTS give terrorist organizations the ability to transfer money under the radars of various federal
and international agencies.136 Furthermore, many IFTS in post-conflict
regions exhibit exploitative tendencies, because they are the only financial
options available in a particular area.137 Lack of access to records and
ambiguous settlement procedures allow for IFTS to be vulnerable to abuse
by those in control.138 In Afghanistan, for example, the hawaladars are not
required to open their books for inspection or auditing under Afghani
law.139 This makes it very difficult to trace transactions ending with or
stemming from terrorist organizations or exploitive hawaladars.
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V. COMPETING IN THE REMITTANCE MARKET
Understanding and learning from the success of IFTS provides the
formal banking regime with the key to simultaneously unlock the lucrative
remittance market and to gain further financial access to various underserved communities. Although remittance transactions may seem small
and unremarkable at first glance, “[w]orldwide annual remittances amount
to more than one hundred billion dollars,” sent either from an industrialized nation to a developing one or within developing or conflict regions.140 With such continuous growth in the international and domestic
remittance markets, it is important for formal banking institutions to understand why IFTS dominate certain markets, and to use these lessons to
improve the formal remittance transfer system and financial infrastructure
in challenging areas.
A. The Remittance Market
The impact of the remittance market will not diminish with time as
global migration flows continue to expand and grow. In fact, total remittance flows continue to increase and have doubled in a period of less than
ten years.141 Remittances have a significant impact on the receiving country, particularly those with a large diaspora population abroad. The country of Guyana, for example, has a population of approximately 700,000,
but the Guyanese diaspora numbers over half a million, allowing remittances to comprise at least 10% of Guyana’s GDP.142 Small countries are
not the sole beneficiaries of remittances. India, even as a rapidly rising
global power, is the world’s largest remittance recipient.143 Indian remittance transactions represent roughly 73% of remittance flows to South
Asia and 15% worldwide.144 In Central and Latin America, Mexico dominates with 34% of the remittances to the region and 8% worldwide, and in
Southeast Asia, the Philippines takes in 43% for the region and 8%
worldwide.145
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The flow of remittances impacts not only the receiving country but also the country in which the immigrants now reside. Global migration
flows indicate that both unskilled, or “high-volume,” and skilled, or “highvalue,” workers emigrate.146 While the prevailing stereotype suggests that
unskilled migrants send money back home to relatives, the “[growing]
movement of highly skilled, highly trained professionals”147 leads to the
logical conclusion that remittance rates will continue to rise exponentially,
because these immigrants will have access to significantly more disposable income.
Finally, remittance flow impacts the domestic finances and policies of
a state, especially states with significant population movement from rural
to urban areas, 148 and states experiencing civil unrest, political violence,
natural disasters, or war. 149
There is, however, often a discrepancy between what the IMF or
World Bank estimate, and what central state banks estimate with regard to
the flow of remittances into a given country. For example, the World Bank
reported in 2002 roughly $2 billion in remittances to the Philippines, whereas the Philippines’ central bank reported over $6 billion.150 This discrepancy is further exacerbated by the fact that central banks often significantly under-report informal funds transfers, and because remittances
conducted via direct deposit do not register as remittance transactions.151
It is extremely important to remember that the sending of money back
to one’s country of origin—to parents, family, or friends—is often simply
a cultural characteristic of many immigrant families, and not necessarily
about the money itself.152
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B. Difficulties of Formal Remittances
Most international remittance transfers occur through licensed regional
or international businesses.153 Western Union is the largest example of
such a company.154 Domestic remittances, frequently evidenced by migrant workers in urban cities sending money home to their families in rural
villages, often can be sent via the post office.155 However, all of these
formal options, including banks, face the same obstacles, namely cost and
accessibility.
In a recent study by the Centre for Micro Finance at the Institute for
Financial Management Research and the Reserve Bank of India’s College
for Agricultural Banking, 274 domestic migrant workers and their families
were interviewed on how they conducted their personal banking.156 The
intent of the study was to understand how various remittance channels
were utilized in India.157 More than half of the respondents (57%) indicated that they used IFTS to transfer money back to their families.158 Only
13% of the workers used the Indian Post to transfer funds, and 30% used
the banks to transfer funds.159 The Post was found to be the most costly
option: 5% of the total transfer fee, plus another 1% in bribes, not to mention indirect costs.160 Meanwhile, banks’ average fee was 3% of the total
transfer, but respondents cited lack of accessibility as the primary disadvantage for banks.161 The banks were either too difficult to reach, required
too many documents to open an account, or involved too long of a wait.
Total time to make a transaction through the bank, meaning travel and
wait time, was 2.5 hours on average.162 IFTS, on the other hand, averaged
a 4.6% transfer fee, including incidental costs such as bribes or travel
costs, but an average wait time of only forty-eight minutes.163
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More often than not, poor domestic or international migrant workers
are excluded from the formal payment system because it is unsatisfactory
and expensive. As a result they must depend on IFTS. The IFTS succeed
where formal institutions cannot for the reasons discussed below.
C. IFTS’ Operational Characteristics
The formal international banking system has much to learn from the
success of IFTS like Hawala. Of particular note are the operational characteristics that make IFTS so effective in regions where formal banking has
failed. These operational characteristics reflect the concerns of the participant customers and, unlike the formal system, work to alleviate many of
these problems.
1. Efficiency and Speed
One of the primary concerns of parties trying to conduct a remittance
transaction is the speed with which the money will arrive. As mentioned
previously, remittances are often used to provide emergency services or
pay bills for relatives in another country. Between major international
cities, the average informal funds transfer takes between six and twelve
hours.164 When the informal funds exchange is between countries in different time zones or with different languages,165 the transaction can occur
within twenty-four to forty-eight hours; however, if the remittance is being
sent to an extremely rural area, an area with limited telecommunication
technology, or a village without a local hawaladar’s office, the transaction
can take slightly longer.166 In contrast, a typical formal transaction through
a bank can take up to a week.167
The informal funds transfer is also not hampered by state government
and international regulation requirements that exist in many countries
throughout South Asia, Europe, and the United States.168 As is to be expected, the bureaucracy of the formal sector slows any transaction, both
financial and non-financial, to a rate that makes it unable to compete with
the informal sector.169
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The ideal time frames discussed above are still better than what the
formal sector is actually able to provide.170 In countries with little to no
financial infrastructure—often due to conflict—banks simply cannot operate or conduct any type of transaction.171 Afghanistan provides a clear
illustration of the IFTS’ resilience when compared to formal institutions:
due to the prolonged conflict in that country, the banking infrastructure
has been significantly damaged, but an informal transfer to Kabul from a
major foreign city will only take from six to twelve hours, and one from
Kabul to regional centers within Afghanistan will take under twenty-four
hours.172
2. Accessibility and Adaptability
Accessibility and adaptability are two characteristics that operate in
tandem, because IFTS’ customers come from a plethora of nations, many
of which might be suffering from endemic conflict, financial troubles, or
growing industrialization.173 Often there is a complete lack of faith in the
formal banking system of the country of origin.174 Also, many of these
banks lack the capacity or infrastructure needed to conduct international or
domestic remittances.175 Unlike formal banks, IFTS can operate in very
unstable conditions, because the core of an informal funds transfer simply
relies on the ability of two individuals to communicate with each other by
any means necessary.176 This flexibility is also crucial on a more individual basis, as it can allow participants who are perhaps illiterate, or do not
speak the language, to send money to their country or city of origin without having to open a bank account or write a check.177
This adaptability is helpful not only for countries suffering from conflict but also for those suffering from an economic crisis or a natural disaster.178 For example, after the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, Pakistan’s foreign exchange liquidity was so badly debilitated that even the large influx
of humanitarian aid and remittances did not meet the foreign exchange
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requirements needed by the formal sector.179 As a result, IFTS became a
necessary avenue through which aid could flow, because banks were essentially stonewalling the desperately needed funds.180 Haiti is another
example of this problem: an IFTS could have been a method of acquiring
funds in Haiti during the post-earthquake aftermath. Haitian banks did not
open until January 23rd, 2010, nearly ten days after the earthquake hit,181
and the existing payment structure was left in shambles by the disaster. 182
3. Affordability
The cost of conducting transactions is another customer concern that
IFTS can alleviate, but the formal sector cannot.183 The average cost of
transferring funds through an IFTS, between major international cities,
ranges between 2–5% of the value being transferred.184 This fee range is
based on the relationship between the parties, the destination, the currency, the amount being transferred, and the negotiating skills of the parties
involved.185 Because many hawaladars operate other businesses that require money transfers—such as import/export exchanges, jewelry shops,
ethnic grocery stores, and travel agencies—they already have the mechanisms in place to conduct remittance transactions.186 In fact, a hawaladar
can conduct business right from his or her home. All that is needed is a
telecommunication device: a phone, fax machine, or computer with internet access.187 This simple infrastructure creates very low overhead as
compared to the formal system, further bringing down transactional costs
for customers.188
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4. Anonymity
Virtually all IFTS have very little in the way of standard documentary
procedures or accounting requirements, and thus ensure some degree of
anonymity.189 IFTS do not require much paperwork, if any, to start or
open an account.190 There is no minimum balance or minimum transfer
amount. This is an especially important feature for low-income workers
trying to send money home, and for low-income families trying to receive
that money. Furthermore, it is very rare for a hawaladar to keep records of
individual or retail transactions; rather, they will keep track of the wholesale transactions mentioned earlier.191 Remittance transactions, if ever
recorded, are often written in code, in very ambiguous or general terms, or
in such inconsequential amounts that the average observer would not even
notice the transaction.192 One can equate this to note-taking in a class.
Most individuals have their own system of taking notes, and often another
person trying to decipher those notes can find the task virtually impossible. As discussed earlier, the only customer identification that is required
in most informal funds transfers is the code transmitted to the beneficiary.193 Even this code, along with any other identifying documents, is
usually destroyed upon the completion of the transaction.194
The most important aspect of anonymity in informal funds transfers is
the fact that formal identification is not required.195 This factor might be
difficult for some to understand, but in many cultures, the communities do
not feel protected by the state.196 In the past, merchants in the Middle East
and Africa rarely felt protected by the state, because unlike their European
counterparts, the states lacked a “protectionist” attitude towards the middle
class and communities from different tribes or clans.197 IFTS fill the needs
of the community in a way that the formal system cannot. For example,
“[i]n the post-September 11, 2001 world, typical users of the [IFTS], [especially] those of Middle Eastern ... descent, already are highly sensitized
to the heightened government scrutiny” and intrusion of privacy.198 As
189
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such, “[t]hose users are unlikely to prefer a system replete with records
and paper trails [and] [e]ven legitimate customers ... may desire anonymity and hesitate to draw unwanted attention to themselves or their families
overseas.”199 The cultural idiosyncrasies of a community play a significant
role in the remittance market and IFTS as a whole.
5. Cultural Context and Sensitivity
Sensitivity to various cultures and adaptability to local community
needs is a key operational characteristic that puts IFTS far ahead of the
formal banking institutions, both in the remittance market and in accessing
the poor and underserved.200 The concept of sending remittances is one
born of both necessity and tradition, but not all diaspora communities or
domestic migrants can afford the time, energy, and money required to
send funds or services through formal channels.201 In illiterate or poorly
educated migrant communities, a friendly, local hawaladar is a far more
appealing individual to entrust with the handling of hard-earned funds than
a faceless bank.202 This cultural sensitivity factors in at the originating and
receiving ends of the transaction.203 For example, in Somalia, money
transmitters usually recruit agents through clan connections.204 Middle
Eastern communities, on the other hand, are the most popular example
with regard to IFTS’ cultural context. In very conservative diaspora communities with more restrictive traditions, a trusted hawaladar who respects
or understands the social mores of the community would be viewed as an
“acceptable intermediary” with whom to conduct business.205
6. Trust through Relational Contracts
Though many of these operational characteristics that make IFTS so
successful cannot realistically be implemented by the formal system to
improve competitiveness in the remittance market, there is at least an
overarching lesson to be gleaned from IFTS: trust through relational contracts. All of the operational characteristics rely on an innate semblance of
trust with the broker and within the IFTS community.206 Because of this
199
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social element within the IFTS, there is very rarely fraud or a failure to
transfer funds, unlike with commercial options such as Western Union.207
Hawala’s high rate of success and reliability is accomplished by creating
incentives to perform and minimizing risks and costs.208
International transfers—whether of goods, services, or money—are
extremely risky.209 The moment a client hands over the money, he is exposed to the risk of being held up by a hawaladar, who faces virtually no
consequences in an unregulated system.210 IFTS, however, are able to
establish internal legal safeguards ensuring completion of the transaction,
because the system breaks the risky transactions into palatable bite-size
pieces, “break[ing] down a direct transaction between ... parties that would
be encumbered by prohibitively high transaction costs and risks into a
series of [smaller] transactions.”211 This reduces risk and promotes performance.212 IFTS turn the risky exchange into a “self-fulfilling contract[]” by requiring personal investment,213 thus making it a reliable
transaction.214 The extent of a hawaladar’s clientele depends on his reputation with the surrounding community; failure to comply will result in
expulsion from the hawaladar network and “blacklisting.”215 As a result,
with every informal transaction there is a personal interest at stake for all
parties involved, especially for the broker.216 This investment is the hawaladar’s social capital, which in turn helps build his reputation.217 A vested
interest born of concern for reputation cultivates an emphasis on long-term
relationships rather than opportunistic ones, which further limits risk and
promotes performance.218
The IFTS’ ability to induce such an investment without formal regulations has been explained using the economic clubs theory, which discusses
the bridge between private and public goods.219 Specifically, “a club is a
207

Id.
Id.
209
Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 407.
210
Id. at 415.
211
Id. at 410.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 417.
214
See Maimbo, supra note 62, at 5.
215
Id.
216
Beyond social capital, substantial start-up capital is required in order to establish
one’s own remittance network. This is why most enter the remittance business after
having built up capital through prior business activities, such as operating a jewelry store.
Lindley, supra note 85, at 523.
217
Schramm & Taube, supra note 22, at 412.
218
Id. at 410.
219
Id. at 411.
208

2012]

HAWALA’S CHARM

301

voluntary group of people gaining mutual benefits from sharing either
production costs, special members’ characteristics, or a good that can be
characterized by excludable benefits.”220 Based on this definition, IFTS
sound like fairly typical clubs. By creating shared benefits, also known as
public goods, IFTS are able to overcome the opportunism that often plagues high-risk transactions such as international monetary transfers.221
Establishing and preserving one’s reputation within the club, which is
needed for success, can be viewed as an investment of social capital.222
This capital becomes a public good because the existence of the informal
funds transfer “club” relies on the characteristics of the investments placed
into it.223 Simply being a member of an IFTS, which occurs upon making
an initial investment, does not result in any payoff; rather, a member must
continue to make as many investments as possible, which in this case
would be the financial transactions.224
Finally, customary or unwritten law also acts as a means of enforcement to further strengthen the emphasis on trust, community, and social
capital across networks.225 This was especially evident in Somalia, where
agents were dealing with agents from other clans.226
VI. IMPROVING ACCESS TO FINANCE BY APPLYING IFTS’
CHARACTERISTICS TO FORMAL BANKING INSTITUTIONS
This analysis of IFTS across the globe matters to the formal banking
institution because it offers clues on how to compete in the remittance and
previously inaccessible markets. IFTS are able to succeed in unstable and
dangerous environments despite their lack of a formal institutional capacity or state-based foundation.227 Indeed, “[b]anks have realized that the
pool of remittance money leaving [countries such as] the United States for
Latin America and the rest of the world is not negligible.”228 This trend is
likely to become more prevalent as globalization and the movement of
groups of people continue.229 In 2005, remittance flows from the United
States were estimated at roughly $167 million, an increase of $7 million in
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less than a year.230 Put simply, this is a worldwide, multi-billion dollar
industry that encompasses household income, global corporations, and
local enterprises.231
At the same time, providing access to the underserved and the poor
should be integrated into any financial agenda, regardless of whether IFTS
exist in the targeted market. In Pakistan alone, 50% of the population lacks
access to formal or informal financial systems; about 30% have access to
informal systems; and 14.3% have access to the formal financial system.232 This disparity is especially disturbing, because although rural areas
are the most underserved and the least financially literate, the same regions often show the most interest in, and are the hungriest for, access to
financial services.233
By applying key operational characteristics found in IFTS—namely
efficiency and accessibility, adaptability, integration, and cultural flexibility—formal institutions can improve their approach to the remittance market, and in turn allow access to formal financial services to be expanded to
the poor and underserved.234 Affordability of services is dependent on the
success and presence of the other operational characteristics present in
IFTS. By adopting IFTS-inspired techniques, formal institutions could in
turn become a more affordable option for vast segments of the population.
Promoting mobile banking programs, implementing adaptable banking
procedures, integrating IFTS into the formal system, and including cultural considerations in banking strategies are possible tools inspired by the
informal networks.235 Applying these Hawala-inspired techniques will
help formal banks maximize the positive effects of remittances for recipients, communities, and countries/cities of origin, all the while improving
access to the underserved and poor.236
A. Efficiency and Accessibility: Mobile Banking
In 2005, cellular phones became the first communication device to
have more users in poor countries than in wealthy ones, and in 2010 cell
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phone owners in poor and developing countries “accounted for two-thirds
of the world’s 4.77 billion phones.”237 This is twice the amount of people
who have bank accounts in those same countries.238 This trend should
begin, and has begun, to be recognized by the banking community as a
means to provide them with access to individuals in developing and postconflict regions.239 Mobile banking can provide individuals with access to
their bank accounts or transferred funds via cell phone.240
For example, with the assistance of the USAID, the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation started the Haiti Mobile Money Initiative “to encourage
mobile operators and banks to launch mobile money services” in Haiti.241
Participating mobile operators offered Haitians the ability to store funds,
purchase goods, and conduct transactions through their cell phones.242 The
program was put into place prior to the devastating earthquake of 2010,
and it helped provide access to services while the banks remained closed
in the aftermath of the quake.243
The Philippines, meanwhile, has installed a nationwide mobile banking program for rural banks as a means of tapping into the informal funds
transfer market.244 By seeking innovative and new methods of access,
formal institutions can “reach low-income clients who were previously
uneconomical to serve,” as well as other participants in the remittance
market.245 By encompassing IFTS’ key operational characteristic of accessibility, mobile banking could prove to be an economical solution for
formal banking.246
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B. Adaptability: Financial Procedures and Services
One of the primary challenges formal institutions face in trying to
access the remittance market and/or trying to provide access to the poor is
the lack of stable financial infrastructures in many of the countries with
the greatest need.247 This is especially evident in conflict or post-conflict
regions.248 At the same time, a functioning financial sector is crucial to
promoting growth and reducing poverty, both of which are paramount to a
populace’s economic and social recovery,249 even if said financial sector is
dominated by an IFTS. IFTS’ adaptability is critical to their success. Formal institutions can learn from this operational characteristic by switching
the focus of financial reform in post-conflict regions from “the brick and
mortar of institutions” to “financial products and services.”250 This means
providing the people with legitimate and practical financial resources, and
not just focusing on building the financial infrastructures from scratch.
Formal institutions should not focus on what a country does not have, but
should focus on working with what a country already possesses. For example:
if the country has “established social norms and practices
[to] determine an individual’s financial standing,” then this
should suffice in place of a formal credit registry;251
if the country has non-collateralized lending practices that
survived the conflict, then it is not necessary to focus energy on immediately creating “an active property registry to
facilitate collateral based lending;”252
if the country has a “national network of intermediaries that
facilitate the clearance of bills of exchange,” then construction of a national payment system can wait;253 and
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if the country has codes of conduct enforced by member associations or traditional systems of justice, then a prudential legal framework can be eventually incorporated
through the established code at a later date when other crucial priorities have been met.254
If the formal banking institutions initially relaxed some of their requirements, then it is more likely that the poor and underserved of these regions
will want to open an account and use the bank’s services.255
Unfortunately, many institutions venture into developing or postconflict regions with mandatory requirements for borrowing, transferring,
or opening an account.256 This is an instant turn-off for many of the underprivileged, because when “[u]sing access to credit as a benchmark, the
perception of borrowers is that the informal sector operates with much
lower service requirements.”257 Going back to the idea of relational contracts, IFTS are more willing to enter into these transactions on the basis
of “social contracts.”258 Requiring credit references, a credit history, and
documentation from individuals surviving a devastating conflict is both
unrealistic and highly insensitive to those survivors’ plight. In effect, the
banks are putting the survivors in a position where they have to resort to
potentially exploitative IFTS. By working with the financial building
blocks or structures already in place—even if they are old, tattered, or
bullet-ridden—tools for financial access can be established more quickly,
thus providing access to financial services for those who truly need it.
C. Broad Integration
Outlawing IFTS is not the solution for ensuring the success of the formal banking regime in the remittance market or for increasing access to
financial instruments for the underserved, because “[t]he semicriminalization of small-scale money transmissions rebounds negatively
on immigrant communities for whom these systems offer the most ... affordable and reliable way to send money home.”259 Rather, success for
both the banking world and the underserved communities could be jointly
accomplished by broadly integrating the IFTS into the formal economy.
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Somalia serves as an example, showing that IFTS can help a relatively
prosperous economy exist in a failing, anarchic state. Essentially, IFTS
can act as micro-financing institutions. Instead of operating solely outside
the realm of banks, the IFTS can be given “access to national and regional
payments systems and electronic retail facilities [that] will go a long way
toward meeting the requirements of the retail and business sector in terms
of banking facilities.”260 Not only does this promote development in regions with little to no banking infrastructure, it also provides access to
those communities that desperately need various forms of financial services.261
The caveat is that this can prove to be extremely difficult. In addition
to the deep-seated issues of trust that many communities face when confronted with formal institutions, trying to integrate a culturally embedded
practice into what is often deemed a western financial model can be
viewed as a paternalistic attempt to usurp a centuries-old tradition.262
D. Shift in Banking Culture
In order for formal financial institutions to succeed in capitalizing on
the benefits of migrating populations and their disposable income, banks
need to create financial links between the diaspora communities and their
countries of origin.263 If the formal industry wants any chance in competing with IFTS, it must recognize the need for trust through relational contracts with the immigrant diasporas in the communities’ specific cultural
context.264 Relying simply on foreign banks with American branches is
not the solution to gaining access to the diaspora communities, as is the
current practice in the United States.265 In fact, American banks have just
begun to become involved in remittances within the past twenty years,
even though the United States has the largest aggregate immigrant population in the world.266 This simply results in higher costs for customers,
which in turn further drives away the lucrative market.267 Unfortunately,
promoting such a change in the long-established American banking culture could prove to be extremely difficult.
260
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CONCLUSION
Because Informal Funds Transfer Systems, or Hawala networks, function successfully across the globe in spite of significant problems that
plague formal banking transactions in the very same regions,268 it is very
important to continue to expand research into the various IFTS. Beyond
their shadowy reputation, IFTS function as robust financial systems that
provide services and financial tools to large immigrant or migrant communities and those left vulnerable by conflict.269 The distinct operational
characteristics of IFTS—efficiency, adaptability, affordability, anonymity,
cultural sensitivity, and trust through relational contracts—allow IFTS to
fill the needs of communities that the formal banking regime has deemed
inaccessible or uneconomical.270 As a result, the formal banking institutions have limited access to the ever-growing remittance market, a market
that is continuing to expand as populations and migration patterns shift
both internationally and domestically.271
Formal remittance banking is impeded by significant accessibility and
cost issues, especially in post-conflict regions.272 Based on the success of
IFTS in seemingly unstable regions, formal banking institutions can compete through the use of innovative financial inclusion techniques. Mobile
banking273 and adaptive banking practices274 can provide the underserved
with the opportunity to have access to formal financial services in a much
quicker fashion. Other possible solutions include the broad integration of
the IFTS275 into the formal system, or a cultural shift in the banking community,276 to encompass more relational contracts. Both of these solutions,
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however, will be difficult to implement. Regardless of these potential
difficulties, formal banking institutions can learn lessons from IFTS in
their attempt to provide greater access to financial services for the poor
and underserved in developing and post-conflict regions, while profiting at
the same time from the exponentially expanding remittance market.
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